Here are some thoughts as to how the Stanley and Krakauer 2013 article (see here for my notes on the article) intersects my work, and the new directions it gives me in rethinking things.
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In Ch 5 of Political Physics (2001) I talk about the inflated Platonic sense of techne as grasp of form, proved by verbal articulation of first principles, and then used to command the artisan to incarnate the form into passive matter.
I then show that this falls prey to Simondon's objection: such hylomorphism (production as incarnation of form in matter) is just the projection of the master's point of view, and ignores the "somatic knowledge and aesthetic sensitivity" (PP 124) of the artisan, who must detect the traits indicating potentials for self-organization of the matter as well as provide the apparatus by which those traits are actualized (the molds into which the clay is put and the kiln that bakes the bricks for instance).
It's true I think that my emphasis on the somatic and aesthetic teeters on the edge of falling into the false dichotomy S and K diagnose: either knowledge / skill is (Platonically) verbally articulable or it is bodily knack / habit. But I think I can rescue myself, if I'm able to expand on what "artisanship" means.
Yes, there is an element of non-articulable "aesthetic sensitivity" to the detection of traits of material self-organization (the feel of when the clay has the right consistency to be put into the oven so that its colloidal micro-structures will be expressed at the macro-level as the capacity of the brick to bear weight). But there is also considerable propositional knowledge (even if not always verbally articulable) in the construction and operation of the mold and kiln. It's true that I don't emphasize that, but I think it's implicit in "artisanal labour" (PP 124).
See the passage at PP 128, where I say the educational artisan must "choose" the right songs. If I would have expanded on that, I think I could have seen the sort of propositional even if not verbally articulable knowledge S and K require, even though Plato denigrates that as "happy gift of nature":
Here the harmonized soul is the goal of musical education; the philosopher sets forth the criterion of a harmonized soul, but it is left to the artisanal labour of craftsmen set to work under philosophic direction to choose the exact components of the musical regime that will produce the harmonious soul. 'But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace . . . ' (Republic 401 c). (PP 128)
I also include an analysis of what Plato says about teaching of motor skills (how to drive a chariot). Here I think I'm getting close to what S and K say about knowledge as scaffolding for development of motor acuity:
On the other hand, it is chariot driving itself that is the mark of the techne of chariot driving, so we would have to observe Nestor's driving, not his instructions, to judge his skill at chariot driving. Thus there's a double problem with Socrates' demand: techne is judged by production, not teaching, while teaching is not accomplished by commands, but by setting up a regime of somatic training.
Once again, then, in this example we see the hylomorphic emphasis on exterior command in the production of a body politic. Technical teaching is important, but it does not consist of instructions to be obeyed, but in setting up a regime of exercises in which trainees develop somatic skill. Thus the relation of teacher/student is not that of master/slave: a regime of exercises is not an order given on the spot, but an artisanal coaxing that actualizes a certain combination of the virtual potentials of the student's body. The most radical point of our analysis is that somatic skill is more complex than instructions, more precise, more refined. The challenge of contemporary anti-Platonism is to turn around logo-prejudice: it is words that are clumsy, abstract, and so on, not the somatic skills long associated with a brute and stupid 'body'. (PP 132)
So, yes, here it's too much a simple (Dreyfusian?) inversion of Platonism, when it comes to the actual driving of the chariot, which I'm calling "somatic skill." Certainly part of that is what S and K call motor acuity. But it's true that I neglect what they call the propositional knowledge of the chariot driver (knowing what to do to initiate the action displaying the skill of chariot driving), as well as any selection of the right actions while in the chariot. But I do think that I'm close to giving the coach credit for propositional knowledge in setting up the training regime that allows the development of motor acuity (and, indeed, propositional knowledge) on the part of the driver.
I think there's also the same problem / potential in what I say about Plato's bit about nurses in the Laws. (PP 133-35). If I were to expand on that, I'd stress that the slave women had to have received lots of instruction and / or exposure in order for them to be able to discern and choose the right songs. Again, I juxtapose their intuition (which Plato calls guesswork) to the Platonic demand for verbal articulation as hallmark of techne.
In this more recent paper on the topic I say there is a "singularity of bodily rapport" at work, but I think that fits into the perceptual / motor acuity side of things: the nurses have to sense how hard the baby is crying (perceptual acuity) and then they have to perform the lullaby in the correct way (motor acuity: not too much force, not too little, etc). So while I don't emphasize the propositional knowledge components (the scaffolding as S and K put it) I don't think it's inimical to my analysis: I would just have to widen the lens a bit to include the apprenticeship of the nurses.
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These are just a few quick reactions. I'll be keeping the Stanley and Krakauer paper in mind as I re-read other parts of my work and move ahead in future work.
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