I had one of those M. Jourdain moments today. I was preparing a lecture on Ch. 2 of Time and Free Will for my Bergson course, explaining the distinction between discrete and continuous multiplicities. Here's what I wrote:
Bergson will distinguish two forms of multiplicity, discrete and
continuous.
In his Bergsonism, Deleuze traces the notion of multiplicity
back to Riemann. According to D, roughly speaking, a discrete multiplicity has an internal metric: that is, one of its units can serve as a measure for other units. For example, the first inch of a ruler can measure other parts of the ruler (this part is 1.5 inches long, this other one is 3.7 inches long, etc.)
But a continuous multiplicity has to find its metrics (note the plural) elsewhere than in one of its [spatial] parts: for example, in the forces working within it. The key is that continuous multiplicities are both continuous and heterogeneous. That means they change their nature (their genus) when they divide. That means that each “indivisible” stage in their unfolding process needs its own measure.
At this point, I thought I would riff a bit on how this illuminates Deleuze's notion of the distinction between ethics and morality:
Morality has one (abstract) standard which is applied from
above, crushing the singularity of concrete situations. [Just as psychoanalysis
crushes the singularity of desiring-production by applying Oedipus.] In other
words, it treats life as a discrete multiplicity: there is one unit internal to
the multiplicity that can measure all other parts of the multiplicity. The key
is the spatial notion of “part” which ensures the homogeneity of the thing:
moral situations differ only in degree.
Ethics, OTOH, requires the concrete
analysis of the affects generated in encounters of bodies. Thus its metrics are
plural and generated on the spot, and must be evaluated on the spot in the full
concrete singularity of the situation. In my Schiavo paper, I argue that this
is what should ground the liberal notion of the right to privacy, rather than
sovereignty-based notions.
That's when it hit me: following Deleuze, I've been a full-fledged moral particularist all along!
h/t to Chris Blakley!